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Abstract 
 
The Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats are often portrayed as BritainÕs pro-
European parties. Indeed, both parties express a keen interest in keeping Britain in the 
European Union (EU) and in promoting a constructive engagement with other 
member states. Yet, to what extent can the two parties be characterized as Europhiles? 
In this article, we develop Taggart and SzczerbiakÕs (2008) concept of hard and soft 
Euroscepticism, extend it to Europhile party positions, and apply it to Labour and the 
Liberal DemocratsÕ recent European policies. For this purpose, we analyze manifestos 
and party leadersÕ key speeches on the EU. We find, overall, that the Labour Party 
and the Liberal Democrats are ÔsoftÕ Europhiles whose discourses have focused on 
EU reform. Yet, whilst their EU policies are very similar, their EU strategies differ: 
the Labour leadership have generally tried to contain the salience of EU issues, 
whereas the Liberal Democrats have followed a more offensive EU strategy after 
2014. This can best be explained through electoral incentives and internal dynamics.  
 
Keywords: Euroscepticism, Europhilia, Labour Party, Liberal Democrats, European 
policy.  
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Introduction  
  
BritainÕs ÔawkwardÕ relationship with the European Union (EU) is a topic that fills 
library shelves. Since Britain joined the European Union in 1973, the two main 
parties, the Labour Party and the Conservative Party, have been critical of BritainÕs 
EU membership at various times (Geddes, 2013; George, 1998). In the 1970s and 
early 1980s, the Labour Party was deeply divided over BritainÕs EU membership 
(Daniels, 1998). In the past two decades, large sections of the Conservative Party 
have called for BritainÕs exit from the EU (Lynch, 2015; Bale, 2006). This situation 
culminated in October 2011, when 81 Conservative Members of Parliament (MPs) 
defied Prime Minister David Cameron to call for a referendum on Britain's EU 
membership (The Guardian, 25/10/2011). In January 2013, David Cameron then 
promised a referendum on whether the UK should stay in the EU for 2017, thereby 
trying to appease Eurosceptic conservative backbenchers.  
 
In very few other member states has EU membership been as controversial amongst 
mainstream parties as in the UK. What is more, the recent successes of the UK 
Independence Party (UKIP), which calls for EU withdrawal and has won a 
considerable number of seats in local and European elections, as well as one seat in 
the general election of 2015, has contributed to a EU-hostile environment (Abbarno 
and Zapryanova, 2013). By contrast, the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats are 
often portrayed as BritainÕs ÔEurophilesÕ. For instance, the Economist referred to 
LabourÕs leader Ed MilibandÕs Ôproud EurophiliaÕ (15/03/2014) and to the Liberal 
Democrats as an Ôearnestly pro-EuropeanÕ party (01/03/2014). What is more, the 
Liberal Democrats often stress their Ôproud track record as the most consistently pro-
European party in British politicsÕ (see for instance: Liberal Democrats, 2013). In this 
article, we investigate these claims. We compare the recent European policies of the 
Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats in order to establish their degree of 
Europhilia.  
 
Much has been written about New LabourÕs EU policy record (Daddow, 2015; 
Daddow, 2011; Bulmer, 2008; Forster, 2002). It is often argued that under the 
leadership of Tony Blair (1994-2007), the Labour Party took a particularly pro-
European approach (Heffernan 2001). Yet, BlairÕs former EU adviser, Roger Liddle 
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(2014) argues that the Labour leadership lacked a EU strategy when it took office in 
1997 and, due to their lack of experience in government, missed the opportunity for 
Britain to join the Euro. Thus, despite high aspirations, BlairÕs EU policy record in 
office has been described as Ôat best mixedÕ (Smith, 2005). Schnapper (2015) 
compares the EU policies of Gordon Brown and Ed Miliband, with those of their 
predecessors. She concludes that they distanced themselves from BlairÕs Ôtrumpeted 
Euroenthusiastic rhetoricÕ and instead moved closer to the Ôcautiously and 
unenthusiastically pro-European social democracyÕ of Hugh Gaitskell and Harold 
Wilson in the 1960s and James Callaghan in the 1970s. 
 
Less has been written about the Liberal DemocratsÕ European policies, which is not 
surprising, given that the party had only entered government for the first time in 2010. 
However, the Liberal DemocratsÕ origins are, in part, tied to the European question. 
After all, debates about European integration during the referendum on BritainÕs 
membership of the European Community in 1975 were one of the reasons causing 
Europhile politicians from the Labour Party to break away and form the Social 
Democratic Party. When the latter merged with the Liberal Party to form the Liberal 
Democrats in 1988, their enthusiasm for Europe continued. They supported the single 
currency, a federal Europe, and deeper integration more generally (Russell and 
Fieldhouse, 2005). More recent studies have assessed the role of the EU in the Liberal 
DemocratsÕ coalition with the Conservative Party in 2010. For instance, Goes (2013: 
15) argues that the Conservatives were the drivers of the CoalitionÕs EU policy, whilst 
the Liberal Democrats acted as navigators ensuring, most of the time, that the agreed 
roadmap was respected. Oppermann and Brummer (2014: 566), by contrast, argue 
that the Liberal Democrats initially succeeded in constraining the ConservativesÕ 
ÔEurosceptic aspirationsÕ, but that their influence waned over the years.  
 
The European policies of Labour and the Liberal Democrats have thus been studied 
separately. In this article, we compare the two partiesÕ EU policies to address this gap 
in existing research. Our analysis starts in 2007, when new party leaders came into 
power, and ends in 2015, when these leaders stepped down. We thus focus our 
attention on the EU policy developments under Gordon Brown and Ed MilibandÕs 
leaderships of the Labour Party and Nick CleggÕs leadership of the Liberal 
Democrats.  
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We begin the article by investigating Taggart and SzczerbiakÕs (2008) framework of 
Eurocepticism and by extending it to include Europhilia. Next, we compare the 
positions of Labour and the Liberal Democrats on EU politics, the EU polity, and EU 
policies. We do this by investigating the three main themes we identified in 
manifestos and leadersÕ EU speeches: BritainÕs relationship with the EU; the EUÕs 
institutional design; and, EU economic and monetary policy. We find that in all three 
areas, the parties have more in common than sets them apart; both want Britain to stay 
in the EU, but focus their attention on the EUÕs need to reform. We then explain why 
the two parties are ÔsoftÕ Europhiles, focusing on the EU-hostile political 
environment, their status as parties in government or opposition, and intra-party 
divisions. In the conclusion we discuss the implications of our findings for 
comparative research into Euroscepticism. We argue that while Labour and the 
Liberal Democrats are often portrayed as Europhiles, placing this in a European 
context highlights the limits to their support for European integration.  
 
 
Eurosceptics or Europhiles? Political parties and their European policies 
  !
In the past two decades there has been a growth in comparative research into the 
phenomenon of Euroscepticism. The literature on party-based Euroscepticism draws 
heavily on the work of Paul Taggart (1998: 366) who defined Euroscepticism as Ôthe 
idea of contingent, or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and 
unqualified opposition to the process of European integrationÕ. More recently, Paul 
Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak (2008: 247-248) have refined the concept and now 
distinguish between ÔhardÕ and ÔsoftÕ Euroscepticism. Hard Euroscepticism can be 
understood as Ôprincipled opposition to the project of European integration as 
embodied in the EU, in other words, based on the transfer of powers to supranational 
institutions such as the EUÕ. In contrast, soft Euroscepticism applies to situations 
Ôwhen there is no principled objection to the European integration project of 
transferring powers to a supranational body such as the EU, but there is opposition to 
the EUÕs current or future planned trajectory based on the further extension of 
competencies that the EU is planning to makeÕ. ÔSoftÕ Euroscepticism, in particular, 
has been criticized for being defined Ôin such a broad manner that virtually every 
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disagreement with any policy decision of the EU can be included (Kopeck! and 
Mudde, 2002: 300).  
 
In response to the criticism, Taggart and Szczerbiak (2008) have specified what 
Euroscepticism is not, arguing that a party criticizing the EU for failing to properly 
reflect its countryÕs national interests in, for example, EU budget or EU accession 
negotiations, cannot be described as Eurosceptic. Furthermore, according to the 
authors, Euroscepticism does not apply to a party that is broadly in favour of 
European integration but opposes one or two EU policy areas. They add that this 
depends on the Ôquality of these policy areas being opposed rather than the quantityÕ 
(Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2008: 250). For instance, they specify that a party opposing 
a core policy area such as the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is more likely to 
be categorized as Eurosceptic than a party opposing a peripheral EU policy area.  
 
The concept of Euroscepticism has made major advances in our understanding of 
party positions on Europe, yet it can only be used to analyze degrees of EU 
opposition. It does not help us categorize the positions of parties that are in favour of 
European integration, or Europhiles. The need to disentangle the meaning of party 
positions on the EU has led Flood and Usherwood (2005) to design a typology 
categorizing positions towards the EU in general and towards any given aspect of the 
EU. The categories they use - maximalist, reformist, gradualist, minimalist, 
revisionist, and rejectionist Ð allow for a more nuanced analysis of party positions 
towards the EU. Yet ultimately, what remains significant is the issue of whether a 
party is in favour or against the EU. 
 
In this study, we will therefore extend Taggart and SzczerbiakÕs concept and suggest 
that hard and soft Euroscepticism can be mirrored by hard and soft Europhilia. For 
this purpose, hard Europhilia can be understood as very strong, unconditional support 
for the EU integration project in general, for the EUÕs core policies and institutions, 
and for further transfer of powers to the EU. Strong support for further integration 
need not go against the EUÕs principle of subsidiarity.
1
 For instance, hard Europhiles 
                                                        
1
 The principle of subsidiarity is defined in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. It 
ensures that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen and that constant checks 
are made to verify that action at the EU level is justified in light of the possibilities available 
at national, regional, or local level. Specifically, it is the principle whereby the EU does not 
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would support the extension of the EUÕs powers of fiscal and budgetary oversight, a 
topic that has been salient throughout the Eurozone crisis. Meanwhile, soft Europhiles 
also show strong support for the EU integration project in general. At the same time, 
they call for different, or reformed, EU institutions and policies. Hence, in contrast to 
soft Eurosceptics, soft Europhiles do not oppose the EUÕs key policies and 
institutions; they merely stress the need for change or reform. Soft Europhiles are also 
hesitant towards further integration, or transfer of powers to the EU. Table 1 (below) 
illustrates our conceptual framework.  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
 
In the following section, we will apply this framework to the Labour Party and the 
Liberal DemocratsÕ recent EU policies.  
 
The European policies of Labour and the Liberal Democrats 
 
We analyse and compare Labour and the Liberal DemocratsÕ EU policies along three 
dimensions: politics, polity, and policies. The first dimension refers to the politics of 
the UKÕs EU membership. In recent years, the membership question has 
overshadowed all other EU debates in Britain and led to a referendum on EU 
membership in 2017. With respect to the referendum campaign, Labour and the 
Liberal DemocratsÕ positions on EU membership is highly relevant. Second, we 
investigate the partiesÕ positions on the EU polity, meaning the EUÕs institutional 
structure. Third, we compare Labour and the Liberal DemocratsÕ positions on the 
EUÕs policies. In the recent decades, an increasing amount of policies have become 
ÔEuropeanizedÕ (Graziano and Vink, 2008). As space is limited, we focus on the EUÕs 
economic and monetary policies, which have been a cornerstone of the EU project 
and a salient area of debate in British politics.   
 
Our analysis draws on two main sources: party manifestos and leader speeches. 
Manifestos are authoritative policy statements that have been approved by the party 
organization in a democratic process. Therefore, manifestos are often used to map 
                                                                                                                                                              
take action (except in the areas that fall within its exclusive competence), unless it is more 
effective than action taken at national, regional or local level (Europa.eu, Glossary, n.d.g.). 
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partiesÕ policy preferences (Volkens et al., 2013). Second, party leadersÕ speeches on 
the EU provide a snapshot of current themes and debates, and are therefore a useful 
addition to manifestos. Third, we have also drawn on a newspaper article written by 
Nick Clegg, and on a EU policy document published by the Liberal Democrats, as 
these two documents provide additional details about the partyÕs EU policy.  Table 2 
below lists the documents we used for our analysis.  
 
Table 2 about here 
 
The politics of the UKÕs membership of the European Union  
The Labour Party leadership under Gordon Brown and Ed Miliband unequivocally 
supported BritainÕs membership of the European Union and sold it as a matter of 
Ônational interestÕ. In all manifestos and speeches, the Labour leaders stressed that EU 
membership was in the national/British/our/your/strategic interest. Not surprisingly, 
the last chapter of LabourÕs 2015 general elections manifesto was even entitled 
ÔStanding up for BritainÕs Interests in Europe and the WorldÕ. Table 3 below 
illustrates this trend. 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
The Labour leaders argued that the British economy benefits from the membership of 
the European single market, and that therefore, EU membership is in BritainÕs 
national interest. LabourÕs case for EU membership has, above all, been an economic 
one. British partiesÕ obsession with defending the Ônational interestÕ in Brussels was 
already noted by Helen Wallace in 1997. Today, the three major British parties seem 
to compete in a race for who protects more vigorously the national interest. In this 
competition, they frequently accuse each other of betraying the national interest. This 
is highlighted in Ed MilibandÕs speech to the CBI (10/11/2014) in which he stated: 
 
There are some people in our country who advocate exit from the EU. 
(É) It is a betrayal of our national interest. It is a clear and present 
danger. A clear and present danger to businesses like yours that trade with 
Europe every single day. You know that leaving the single market and 
stepping away from a trading block that allows us to work with the new 
economies, like Brazil, India and China, would be a disaster for our 
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country. It would risk billions of pounds in lost profits, risk millions of 
jobs and would make Britain weaker, not stronger, in the world. 
 
Other benefits from BritainÕs EU membership have also been mentioned, but they 
were given a much lower profile. For instance, in LabourÕs 2009 and 2014 EU 
manifestos, BritainÕs interest in a European response to climate change, social 
inequality, and security threats, comes second, third, and fourth after the economic 
rationale of EU membership. What is more, despite the call for more collective action 
in some policy areas, the party leadership under Ed Miliband dismissed the idea that 
Labour ever wanted a federal Europe (BBC News Online, 25/09/2011), thereby 
echoing Tony BlairÕs preference for an intergovernmental rather than a supranational 
EU (Liddle, 2014: 69). Ed Miliband (12/03/2014) was also keen to stress that ÔÉ 
under Labour, Britain will not be part of an inexorable drive to an ever closer unionÕ.  
 
When Prime Minister David Cameron announced his referendum pledge, both the 
Labour Party and Liberal DemocratsÕ leaderships were under pressure to set out their 
respective strategies. On 12 March 2014, Ed Miliband outlined LabourÕs referendum 
strategy, explaining that the next Labour government would legislate for a lock that 
guarantees that there can be no transfer of powers from Britain to the European Union 
without the consent of the British public through an in/out referendum Ð a promise 
that was enshrined in LabourÕs 2015 manifesto. Yet, Miliband believed it to be 
Ôunlikely this lock will be used in the next parliamentÕ (Miliband, 12/03/2014) as a 
new EU treaty was not on the horizon. However, after LabourÕs defeat in the 2015 
elections, the party underwent a Ôchange of heartÕ (BBC News Online, 24/05/2015), 
thereby backing the Ôin/outÕ referendum announced by David Cameron. Interim leader 
Harriet Harman explained that Labour would still campaign for the UK to stay in the 
EU (BBC News Online, 24/05/2015).  During the Labour PartyÕs 2015 leadership 
campaign, frontrunner Jeremy Corbyn stated that he would not rule out campaigning 
for a no vote in the UKÕs future EU membership referendum owing to David 
CameronÕs position on workersÕ rights (The Guardian, 28/07/2015). After his election 
as the new party leader, Corbyn clarified that he was in favour of the UKÕs continued 
EU membership. Still, in a leaked speech he called David CameronÕs decision to hold 
the EU referendum Ôa cynical, opportunistic ploy to try and win back anti-EU votes 
that had switched from Tories to UkipÕ (Social Europe, 2015).  
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Like Labour, the Liberal Democrats have argued that EU membership serves the 
UKÕs national interest, which they have also defined in primarily economic terms. 
Thus, all European manifestos and all of CleggÕs EU speeches referred to BritainÕs 
(national) interest. Most notably, the 2014 European manifesto referred three times to 
BritainÕs interest in staying in the EU for primarily economic reasons. It states: 
 
(É) Being in Europe is good for Britain. Leaving the EU is the surest way 
to trash our economic recovery. Pulling up the drawbridge would leave 
our nation isolated and diminished in the world. Now is the time to use 
your voice to protect BritainÕs interests (Liberal Democrats, 2014: 4). 
 
Table 4 below illustrates the Liberal DemocratsÕ references to EU membership as a 
means of defending the national interest. 
 
 
To the Liberal Democrats, it was important that Britain played an active role in the 
EU to avoid becoming isolated in EU budget negotiations and in setting the rules of 
the single market. Furthermore, and like Labour, the Liberal Democrats saw the EU 
as an effective way to solve global problems such as climate change, cross border 
crime, and threats to civil liberty (Liberal Democrats, 2013). Therefore, the Liberal 
Democrats committed themselves to holding a referendum on BritainÕs EU 
membership, but tried to avoid holding a referendum in practice. For example, in their 
2009 European manifesto, the Liberal Democrats were the only mainstream party to 
call for a referendum on BritainÕs EU membership, stating:  
 
Of course the EU needs to change. A lot of money is wasted on out-of-
date policies and structures. The EU should concentrate on big issues and 
not get involved when national or regional action would be more 
effective. Liberal Democrats support the Lisbon Treaty because it will 
help do that, making the EU more efficient and accountable. But Britain 
will only win the case in Brussels for a flexible, democratic Europe if we 
settle our arguments at home on whether we should be part of the EU or 
not. That is why Liberal Democrats have argued for a referendum on 
whether Britain stays in or leaves the EU. We are clear where we stand Ð 
you have to be in it to win it (Liberal Democrats, 2009: 3). 
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After 2010, the Liberal Democrats clarified and strengthened their position, calling 
for a referendum on EU membership, but only when there was a substantial shift in 
powers to the EU. In their 2014 European manifesto, they stated: 
 
Liberal Democrats in the Coalition Government supported the European 
Union Act 2011, which will ensure that, in the event of proposals for any 
further significant transfer of powers from the UK to the EU, there will be 
a referendum. Liberal Democrats want this referendum to be an in or out 
referendum, giving every British citizen a say on British membership of 
the European Union (Liberal Democrats, 2014: 33).  
 
Unlike Labour, the Liberal Democrats stood their ground after the 2015 electoral 
defeat and did not support David CameronÕs plans for a EU referendum before the 
end of 2017. However, on 9 June all Liberal Democrat MPs other than Nick Clegg 
who was absent, voted for a referendum on BritainÕs membership of the EU. The 
Liberal DemocratsÕ newly elected leader, Tim Farron, is known to strongly support 
the referendum. Already in 2011, he wrote: 
I am passionate about our membership of the EU, but I am equally 
passionate about allowing the British public to decide the future of that 
membership. An Ôin-outÕ referendum is important for democracy, but it 
would also act as a catharsis. It would force those who take cheap shots at 
Europe whilst not actually wanting us to withdraw, to face up to realities 
(Liberal Democrat Voice, 24/10/2011).  
Overall, regarding their position on BritainÕs relationship with the EU, Labour and the 
Liberal Democrats are soft Europhiles; they support the principle of European 
integration and BritainÕs EU membership.  At the same time, both parties support an 
Ôin/outÕ referendum, thereby putting BritainÕs EU membership at risk. The two 
partiesÕ EU discourse is utilitarian, or instrumentalist, rather than emotive or identity-
based, as there are little or no references to a shared European history, to common 
values or identities in their manifestos and speeches.  
The EUÕs polity 
Despite their general support for European integration, consecutive Labour leaders 
have stressed the EUÕs need to reform its institutions (Kohler-Koch, 2000; Bulmer, 
2008). It is telling that BlairÕs former EU advisor, Roger Liddle, refers to the Ôfamiliar 
Blairite mantra of ÒreformÓ when discussing BlairÕs political arguments for Europe 
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(Liddle, 2014: 89). This reformist line of argument has continued over recent years. In 
each manifesto, Labour called for EU institutional reform. The 2014 European 
manifesto was the first to contain a separate chapter entitled Ôreform and value for 
moneyÕ in which the party argued: ÔEuropean institutions must be reformed to be 
more effective and better suited to meet the needs of its Member States, including the 
UK. Labour has a robust European reform agenda which seeks to achieve thisÕ 
(Labour Party, 2014: 24).  
 
Despite this rhetoric, LabourÕs EU institutional reform plans remained vague. The key 
reform project was a Ôred card systemÕ, which would allow national parliaments to 
express concern with a piece of EU legislation and force the EU to either abandon or 
amend it (Miliband, 12/03/2014). Moreover, there were some suggestions as to 
making the workings of the European Parliament and Commission Ômore streamlined 
and effectiveÕ, e.g. through decreasing the number of Commissioners and portfolios. 
Labour also aimed to abolish the Strasbourg seat of the European Parliament, 
describing it as ÔwastefulÕ in the 2014 European manifesto; a view that was shared by 
the Liberal Democrats. Hence, despite the vague plans, Labour has taken a soft 
Europhile, reformist stance on the EUÕs institutional design.  
 
As for Labour leaders, it is rare for Liberal Democrat politicians to speak about the 
EU polity without first stressing reform. However, the reform plans were more 
detailed and give the impression of a party that put more thought into its EU agenda 
than Labour. The need for EU institutional reform was highlighted in all manifestos. 
Moreover, Nick Clegg referred to EU institutional reform in all of his EU speeches. 
This trend was not new. Already in 2004, when the Liberal DemocratsÕ ÔOrange BookÕ 
was published in an attempt to re-orientate the partyÕs policies, Nick Clegg argued in 
his chapter that the EU should gain public confidence by ending the perpetual 
institutional changes and by focusing on major issues, such as climate change and 
building economic prosperity.  At the same time, however, he remained committed to 
a host of EU institutional reforms, and emphasised the EUÕs need for decentralisation 
(Clegg, 2004).  
 
The Liberal Democrats shared LabourÕs position on the importance of national 
parliaments, arguing that they should be given more powers to shape EU policy 
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(Clegg, 2013). Yet, the Liberal Democrats went further than Labour by calling for the 
introduction of a regular European Affairs question time in parliament to hold 
ministers to account for their positions in European Council meetings. They also 
believed that Ôthe Prime Minister should make a statement to the House of Commons 
setting out the objectives of the government before each European Council meeting, 
giving British MPs a chance to influence the position taken by the British government 
in EuropeÕ (Liberal Democrats, 2014). Furthermore, the Liberal Democrats wanted a 
greater say for local and regional authorities in designing and managing EU funded 
projects (Liberal Democrats, 2009) Ð which is a topic that Labour did not elaborate on.  
Overall, longstanding commitments to a federal Europe have disappeared from the 
Liberal DemocratsÕ official policy statements and speeches by Tim Farron and Nick 
Clegg. The exceptions were the highly pro-federalist statements of former MEPs, 
such as Andrew Duff (House of Lords, 26/02/2008). The missing reference to 
federalism in the partyÕs official statements made the Liberal Democrats more similar 
to Labour. The Liberal DemocratsÕ position on the EU polity is, therefore, 
characterized by soft Europhilia.   
 
The EUÕs economic and monetary policies  
Under BlairÕs leadership, Labour was principally in favour of joining the Euro. 
However, the Labour PartyÕs 1997 manifestoÕs section on the Euro was Ôa piece of 
studied ambiguity to see Labour through an electionÕ (Liddle, 2014: 74) and Blair was 
soon after the election under pressure to announce a Euro-strategy. Under Chancellor 
Brown, the Ô5 testsÕ - a Treasury-led economic assessment Ð had to be met if Britain 
was to join the single currency, and the public had to be consulted in a referendum. 
The introduction of the Euro thus depended on whether the British and European 
economy had converged; whether there was a high level of business and workforce 
flexibility in the UK; whether by joining the Euro the UK would create better 
conditions for firms to invest; whether the British financial industry would benefit 
from the introduction of the Euro; and whether joining the Euro would promote 
economic growth and employment. Due to a number of reasons, amongst them BlairÕs 
initial indecisiveness and the highly publicized rivalry between Blair and Brown, the 
Labour government never put the Euro to a referendum. In their 2009 EU manifesto, 
Labour stated that: Ôin principle we are in favour of membership of the single 
currencyÕ provided that the five economic tests are met. Yet, from then onwards, the 
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party was less and less committed to the Euro. In the 2010 general election manifesto, 
Labour made the following statement: Ôon the Euro, we hold to our promise that there 
will be no membership of the single currency without the consent of the British 
people in a referendumÕ. In the 2014 European manifesto, the single currency is no 
longer even mentioned. In his five speeches on the EU, Miliband referred to the Euro 
only once, and this particular reference was not very positive:  
 
The failures of the Euro shakes peopleÕs confidence in the whole 
European Union. Britain is outside the Euro. And will, in my view rightly, 
remain so. But is that an excuse for leaving? No. I believe we must work 
to ensure that this more flexible European Union, where some countries 
pursue deeper integration and others donÕt, still benefits all (Miliband, 
19/11/2012).  
 
In their 2015 general election manifesto, Labour further clarified their position on the 
Euro by stating that: Ôwe will not join the Euro, and we will ensure EU rules protect 
the interests of non-Euro members.Õ It is thus interesting to note that Labour has not 
only abandoned plans for Euro membership, but that, despite the salience of the 
Eurozone crisis, the party barely mentioned the topic in its manifestos and speeches.  
 
The Liberal Democrats gave stronger support for joining the single currency than the 
other parties in the 1997 and 2001 general elections (Carey and Geddes, 2010). In 
their 2009 EU manifesto, the party maintained their support for joining the Euro, 
stating that Ôit is in BritainÕs long-term interest to be part of the euro which would 
help Britain improve economic stability and boost trade and investmentÕ (Liberal 
Democrats, 2009). The final decision to join the Euro would be made by the public in 
a referendum. However, critics argued that the Liberal Democrats had done little to 
keep the Euro on the agenda after entering government in 2010 (Smith, 2012). Indeed, 
our analysis confirms that the Liberal DemocratsÕ discourse on BritainÕs membership 
of the single currency became less positive and prevalent. Since the outbreak of the 
2008 economic and financial crisis, the Liberal Democrats began arguing that Britain 
should not join the Euro immediately, but should wait until the conditions were right. 
For instance, the 2014 EU manifesto read: ÔLiberal Democrats believe it will not be in 
the British national interest to join the Euro in the foreseeable futureÕ (Liberal 
Democrats, 2014). Thus, the potential positive effects of a future British Euro 
membership were no longer mentioned.  
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Furthermore, from 2011 onwards, Nick Clegg no longer made positive references to 
the single currency in his speeches. For instance, in his speech at Chatham House, 
Clegg merely declared that: ÔJoining the Euro will not be in our interests anytime 
soon Ð certainly not in my political lifetimeÕ (Clegg, 01/11/2011). At the same time, 
the Liberal Democrats acknowledged the need to rescue the Euro and support 
sovereign debt bailouts (Telegraph, 08/07/2011). They also called for the EU to play a 
significant role in regulating the banking sector, and encouraged more cooperation 
between national financial services authorities and the European Central Bank to 
prevent future financial crises (Liberal Democrats, 2009). Thus, both Labour and the 
Liberal Democrats argued that Britain should support the reform of the Euro without 
joining it. Following Taggart and Szczerbiak (2008) rejecting the Euro is a soft 
Eurosceptic position, as the Euro is one of the EUÕs core policies.  
 
Labour and the Liberal Democrats also took similar positions on other important 
economic issues, such as the EU budget, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), 
structural funds, and trade policy. For a long time, the size and purpose of the EU 
budget has been a controversial topic in British politics, and Prime Minister Thatcher 
famously achieved a rebate for Britain in 1984 (Geddes, 2013: 68). Tony Blair and 
Gordon Brown also advocated a reform of the EU budget (OÕDonnell and Whitman, 
2007). The need to reform the EU budget was highlighted in all of LabourÕs 2009-
2015 manifestos. In fact, whenever the EU budget was mentioned in these documents, 
the word ÔreformÕ could be found in the same sentence. Yet, Labour not only 
mentioned the reform of the budget (i.e. how it is spent) but also increasingly stressed 
the need for restraint. LabourÕs 2014 European manifesto was the first to refer to 
restraint, stating: Ô(É) we recognise that at a time of tough choices at home, we must 
argue not just for restraint of the EU budget but also for reformÕ. Labour even 
supported cutting the 2014-2020 EU budget. Labour MPs joined Eurosceptic 
Conservative backbenchers in a rebellion against David CameronÕs plan to vote for a 
budget freeze rather than a budget reduction (Telegraph, 12/02/13; BBC News 
Online, 31/10/2012). Nick Clegg then accused Labour of ÔdishonestyÕ and ÔhypocrisyÕ 
(The Guardian, 31/10/2012). After all, LabourÕs shadow foreign secretary, Douglas 
Alexander, had been Europe minister during the last EU budget negotiations in 2005, 
during the UK presidency of the EU, when Tony Blair had agreed to water down the 
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British rebate and brokered an above-inflation increase in the overall EU budget. 
LabourÕs more recent votes for the EU budget cuts can be interpreted as a tactical 
decision to defy the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government rather than 
a policy U-turn.  
 
The Liberal DemocratsÕ position on the EU budget evolved in a similar, but less 
radical pattern. The need to reform the budget was stressed in the 2009 European 
manifesto, which stated:  
 
The EU budget is in urgent need of wholesale reform so that money is 
spent only on the things the EU really needs to do. (É) We do not see the 
need, in the current context, for any significant growth in the budgetÕs 
size, nor the abolition of the British rebate (Liberal Democrats, 2009: 17).  
 
Yet, the tone of the 2009 manifesto was generally positive, as the Liberal Democrats - 
in contrast to Labour - also mentioned successful projects that were funded by the EU. 
It is thus interesting to note that five years later, the Liberal Democrats followed suit 
and stressed the need for restraint:  
 
At a time of austerity across Europe, Liberal Democrats helped push 
through the first ever reduction in the European Union budget by £30 
billion. We want to build on the savings already achieved and push for 
further reductions in European Union administrative costs including 
through cuts to travel and transport budgets (Liberal Democrats, 2014: 
32). 
 
 
The ÔtoughÕ stance on the EU budget was also highlighted in Nick CleggÕs speeches. 
Most notably, in his speech to Chatham House, Clegg (01/11/2011) stressed: Ôwe will 
not accept an increase, above inflation, to the EU Budget. That is a real terms freeze. 
And we will protect the British rebate in full. That is the toughest position of any 
European country. 
 
Thus, Labour and the Liberal Democrats increasingly toughened their stances on the 
EU budget and ended up agreeing with the Conservative Party on EU budget cuts 
(Conservative Party, 2015). A tough stance on the EU budget has thus become a 
consensus amongst BritainÕs three major parties. Linked to this is LabourÕs and the 
Liberal DemocratsÕ recurrent argument that the proportion of the EU budget spent on 
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the CAP is too large. In all of LabourÕs 2009-2015 manifestos, EU budget reform was 
directly linked to the CAP. For instance, LabourÕs 2014 European manifesto read:  
 
At time of tough choices at home, this not only means restraint in the EU 
budget but also reform. The budget should focus on those items where 
spending at an EU level can save money at the national level, and 
resources should be shifted from areas such as the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) and put into areas of more productive economic 
development, such as research and development for new technologies 
(Labour Party, 2014: 6). 
 
Furthermore, in all of his three key speeches on the EU, Ed Miliband referred to EU 
budget reform, and in two of them, this included CAP reform. Yet, again, the reform 
plans remained very vague.  
 
The Liberal Democrats also mentioned CAP reform in all manifestos and EU 
speeches. Yet, in contrast to Labour, they offered a more detailed reform plan. For 
example, the party proposed to replace the CAP with a new European Sustainable 
Rural Development policy to encourage home grown food, and a fair price for 
farmers. Again, the Liberal Democrats were keen to highlight positive policy 
achievements. For instance, in their 2014 European manifesto, the party stated: 
 
Liberal Democrats in the European Parliament have strongly backed 
reform of the European UnionÕs Common Agricultural Policy. More than 
half of Common Agricultural Policy funds will now be directed towards 
environmental services and tackling climate change (Liberal Democrats, 
2014: 25). 
 
 
Thus, both parties agreed on the need to reform the CAP, but differed in their concrete 
proposals and in their tone.  
 
It also has to be noted that there were economic policy areas where Labour and the 
Liberal Democrats supported a stronger role for the EU. For instance, both parties saw 
the EU as an effective vehicle for international trade because of its ability to broker 
trade agreements with third countries, including the US (Labour Party, 2014; Liberal 
Democrats, 2014).  Furthermore, both parties called for an extension of the EU single 
market. In fact, LabourÕs discourse on the European single market was very positive 
and extensive, especially when compared to the discourse on the Euro, the EU budget, 
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or the CAP. Especially in the 2009 and 2014 European manifestos, Labour referred to 
the economic benefits of Ôthe largest single market in the worldÕ (Labour Party, 2009) 
or Ôa market with 21 million companies generating £11 trillion in economic activityÕ 
(Labour Party, 2014). What is more, Ed Miliband, in his three major EU speeches, 
made a strong case for the UKÕs EU membership on the basis of the single market. 
For instance, in his speech at the London Business School (12/03/2014) he declared: 
 
The economic case for membership is overwhelming. Our membership of 
the EU gives Britain access to a market with hundreds of millions of 
people. With 21 million companies. Generating 11 trillion pounds in 
economic activity. Almost half of all overseas investment in the UK 
comes from within the EU. Directly providing 3.5 million jobs. And much 
of the rest of the investment into our country comes because we are part 
of the single market. 
 
Moreover, Labour supported the completion of the European single market in areas 
like the digital, energy and financial sectors. ÔRemoving the barriers to the single 
marketÕ, Ôcompleting the single marketÕ, and Ôdriving the single market forwardÕ is 
the types of language used in Ed MilibandÕs speeches.  
 
The Liberal Democrats also called for an extension of the single market into areas 
such as energy, financial services, defence, and transport. Like Labour, they used a 
very positive language in their manifestos and speeches, referring to Ôthe largest 
single market in the worldÕ, or Ôthe worldÕs biggest borderless market placeÕ. Nick 
Clegg even described the single market as Ôthe crowning achievement of the EUÕ 
(09/05/2014) and sold it as Ôa British inventionÕ (29/10/2011). Hence, when it comes 
to their positions on the EU single market, Labour and the Liberal Democrats can 
even be described as hard Europhiles.   
 
Overall, however, Labour and the Liberal Democrats can hardly be labelled hard 
Europhiles, as they constantly stressed the deficiencies of the EU. What is more, on 
BritainÕs membership of the Euro, they took a soft Eurosceptic stance. Table 5 below 
provides an overview of LabourÕs and the Liberal DemocratsÕ positions on EU 
politics, the polity, and policies. 
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Table 5 about here 
 
The question is whether the two partiesÕ focus on EU reform has become more 
pronounced in recent years. Our own coding of LabourÕs and the Liberal DemocratsÕ 
general election manifestos since 1997 shows that the two parties have been relatively 
consistent in their emphasis on EU reform. Importantly, however, data from the 
Manifesto Research Group (Volkens et al., 2013) indicates that the parties have 
placed declining emphasis on the positive aspects of European integration (see tables 
6 and 7 below). Thus, reforming the EU has become more significant relative to the 
positive mentions of the EU. 
 
Table 6 about here 
 
Table 7 about here 
 
 
Why so cautious about the EU?  
 
In this section we explain Labour and the Liberal DemocratsÕ cautious approach to 
Europe, which is best understood as soft Europhila. We account for external and 
internal explanatory variables. The external variables refer to the broader political 
environment in which the two parties operate, such as the media and voters, and to 
their status as parties in government or opposition. The internal explanatory variable 
refers to intra-party divisions on the EU that have put pressure on party leaderships. 
 
The Limits of Europhilia 
The UKÕs relationship with the EU is complex, and no other member state has 
negotiated as many opt-outs from core EU policies (such as the Euro or Schengen) as 
the UK. Yet, as Copsey and Haughton (2014) remind us, levels of public 
Euroscepticism are not overwhelmingly high in the UK, compared to some other 
member states. Rather, a great majority of British voters are ÔEU-agnosticÕ and 
change their EU views over time. This volatility makes it difficult for mainstream 
parties to hit the right tone. Furthermore, levels of EU knowledge are low amongst the 
British public (Oppermann and Brummer, 2013). It is also common knowledge that 
news media can fuel public cynicism and scepticism about the EU (de Vreese, 2007). 
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In the UK, the press Ôhave been forthright in their opposition towards the EU and its 
perceived threat to BritainÕs sovereigntyÕ (Usherwood and Startin, 2013: 10). In this 
context, party leaders try to avoid harsh criticism from the largely Eurosceptic press. 
National party elites also respond to the party supportersÕ EU positions. At the same 
time, they also shape them. For example, Sanders and Toka (2013) and Steenbergen 
et al. (2007) demonstrate that party elites and supporters influence each otherÕs EU 
positions. Data from the British Election Study (2004-2013) demonstrates that 
supporters of Labour and the Liberal Democrats (i.e. respondents who said they 
would vote for one of these parties at the next general election) were generally 
strongly approving or approving of BritainÕs membership of the EU; far more so than 
the supporters of the Conservative party. Graph 1 below illustrates this trend. Still, as 
graph 2 below shows, the majority of Labour and Liberal Democrats supporters 
approved rather than strongly approved BritainÕs EU membership. The supportersÕ 
EU preferences can in part explain the two partiesÕ soft Europhilia.  
 
Graph 1 about here 
 
 
Graph 2 about here 
!
Furthermore, these two graphs also depict that Labour and Liberal Democrat 
supporters were very similar in their views on BritainÕs EU membership. This was 
mirrored by the two partiesÕ very similar policies on the EU membership referendum. 
Yet, despite these similarities, the two parties have chosen different EU strategies. 
Most importantly, Labour has sought to depoliticise or defuse EU issues for fear of 
losing votes since the beginning of the 2000s (Oppermann, 2008) and Ed Miliband 
followed the same strategy between 2010 and 2015. Initially, the growth of UKIP had 
also reinforced the Liberal DemocratsÕ long-term strategy of downplaying Europe. It 
was only during the 2014 European parliamentary election campaign that the Liberal 
Democrats had re-gained their confidence to speak out for the EU, as will be 
discussed below.   
 
Being in government or opposition 
  
In government, political parties tend to be more cautious not to clash over policies 
with their coalition partners, whilst in opposition, they can make bolder claims and 
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promises. The Liberal Democrats managed to curtail the Conservative PartyÕs efforts 
to renegotiate the basis of BritainÕs membership of the EU in the 2010 coalition 
agreement (Oppermann and Brummer, 2013). However, in government, the Liberal 
Democrats only played a junior role on foreign policy issues and only played a 
limited role in moderating Conservative Party policy behind the scenes. This drew 
criticism that the party was seeking to avoid talking in public about Europe for fear of 
destabilising the government (Daddow, 2012). As Dommett (2013: 218) has noted, 
the Liberal Democrats struggled to find ways to maintain their distinctiveness while 
in government. By the summer of 2013, the partyÕs campaign team had therefore 
shifted its strategy. It signaled to the party activists and elected officials that it was 
time to focus on Europe. Nick Clegg began speaking publicly about Europe and in 
2014 entered into a series of public EU debates with UKIP leader Nigel Farage. This 
can be identified as a core vote strategy that arguably appeased the core supporters. It 
is significant that 68 per cent of supporters stated that it was a good decision for Nick 
Clegg to challenge Nigel Farage to a EU debate (Liberal Democrat Voice, 
24/04/2014). This EU charm offensive, however, failed to attract voters, as the 
Liberal Democrats lost 10 out of 11 seats in the 2014 European parliamentary 
elections, and 49 out of 57 seats in the 2015 general elections. These defeats had a 
number of reasons, but European policy was, in all likelihood, not a very important 
one. In the UK, EU issue voting, or Ôthe process in which attitudes towards European 
integration translate into national vote choiceÕ (de Vries, 2007: 364) is higher than in 
most other EU countries, due to the high level of partisan conflict over EU issues. 
Still, overall, EU policy is not very salient amongst the British electorate (Clements et 
al., 2013), and both the 2014 and 2015 election campaigns focused on issues other 
than the EU, such as health policy and public spending in general. Hence, speaking 
out for the EU is unlikely to have affected the Liberal DemocratsÕ vote shares.  
 
The example of the Labour Party shows that even in opposition, mainstream party 
leaderships are careful not to come across as hard Europhiles. Under Ed Miliband, EU 
issues were kept at a very low profile. As a consequence, the party took time to decide 
on a referendum strategy and felt pressurised to offer a referendum, against its initial 
plans. This has been interpreted by some as an attempt to defuse differences between 
Labour and the Liberal Democrats in order to retain the allegiance of Liberal 
Democrat supporters who defected to Labour after the 2010 election (Financial Times, 
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12/03/2014). Even during LabourÕs 2014 European campaign, EU issues were kept at 
a very low, barely visible profile. The campaign focused almost exclusively on 
domestic issues. Labour also abstained in their vote for the Party of European 
SocialistsÕ candidate for the presidency of the European commission, Martin Schulz, 
portraying him as a fiscally irresponsible federalist (The Guardian, 01/03/2014). 
Moreover, Ed Miliband refused to join the televised EU debates with Nick Clegg and 
Nigel Farage. However, LabourList (a weblog that is supportive of but independent 
from the Labour Party) conducted a survey of 768 blog readers ahead of the 2014 
European parliamentary elections and showed that 46 per cent wanted Labour to 
spend more time critiquing UKIP compared to 24 per cent who rejected the idea 
(LabourList, 15/05/2014). Still, the EU did not play a major role during LabourÕs 
2015 election campaign, which focused almost exclusively on health policy and the 
costs of living. The following quote from the ÔEuropeÕ section of LabourÕs 2015 
election manifesto illustrates this: ÔLabourÕs priority in government will be protecting 
the NHS [National Health Service] and tackling the cost-of-living crisis. It is not to 
take Britain out of EuropeÕ (Labour Party, 2015: 77). 
 
In other words, being in opposition did not encourage Labour to become more 
Europhile. Instead, the Labour Party continued to contain the salience of EU issues, 
whilst the Liberal Democrats started to speak out for EU membership during the 
second half of their term in government.  
 
Intra-Party divisions on EU issues 
 
Last but not least, intra-party divisions on EU issues within the leadership, but also 
between the leadership and the broader party organization, emerged that made it more 
difficult for LabourÕs and the Liberal DemocratsÕ leaderships to send out a hard 
Europhile message. In the Labour Party, divisions have re-surfaced in recent years. 
Thus, in 2013, the party leadership still rejected a referendum on EU membership, but 
a campaign was launched by a number of former and incumbent MPs and local 
councillors who called for a 2017 referendum. This group, called ÔLabour for a 
ReferendumÕ was formed in May 2013. On their website (2014) the group declared: 
Ôwe have no corporate view on In or Out. Some of our supporters are pro EU, some 
are ÒEuro-realistÓ, seeking a better deal, but favouring remaining in the EU, and 
others are pro the UK leaving the EUÕ. 
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What is more, polls show that in September 2014, 45 per cent of Labour supporters 
backed a referendum against 36 per cent who opposed it (The Guardian, 23/09/2014). 
Ed MilibandÕs promise to keep the referendum lock can thus be interpreted as a 
response to these demands from the party and its supporters. Following the 2015 
general election, a party member survey found that 84.7 per cent of Labour Party 
members would vote in favour of the UK remaining in the EU regardless of any terms 
of renegotiation (Webb and Bale 2015).  
 
At the beginning of the 2000s, the Liberal Democrats were still described as 
Ôuniformly Euro enthusiasticÕ other than the odd dissenter (BBC News Online, 
15/12/2001). It has to be noted that amongst BritainÕs three major parties, the Liberal 
Democrats were the only one led by a (multilingual) former Member of the European 
Parliament, namely Nick Clegg. Moreover, until their defeat in the 2014 European 
elections, Liberal Democrat MEPs, such as Andrew Duff, held very prominent 
positions in the European Parliament due to their EU expertise and pro-integrationist 
positions. In recent years, however, it has become increasingly clear that Europe has 
been divisive in even the most pro-European of the main political parties in Britain. 
The older generation of Liberal Democrats, and especially the members of the House 
of Lords, were generally more Europhile than the younger generation. For instance, a 
study by Julie Smith (2012: 1285) found that Liberal Democrat MPs from the South-
West of England, former heartlands of the party, adopted fairly Eurosceptic positions. 
Internal divisions over European policy became apparent at the 2005 Liberal 
Democrat party conference when the conference rebelled to overturn leadership 
proposals to limit British spending on the EU to 1 per cent of GDP (BBC News 
Online, 19/09/2005). High profile divisions also have occurred since 2005 over 
proposals for referendums on the EU Constitutional Treaty, the Lisbon Treaty, and 
BritainÕs membership of the EU. It appears that in a response to public opinion as 
well as generational changes at the top of the party, the Liberal Democrats have 
become less Europhile. 
 
However, European integration remains popular with party activists. Surveys 
conducted through ÔLiberal Democrat VoiceÕ, the partyÕs discussion website, in 2011, 
show that 48 per cent of the respondents wanted the UK to remain Ôa full member of 
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the EU and work towards ever closer union, economically and politicallyÕ. A further 
37 per cent responded that the UK should remain a full member of the EU, but 
rejected working towards an ever-closer union, economically and politically (Liberal 
Democratic Voice, 03/10/2011). What is more, 58 per cent of members stated that 
they did not want the Liberal DemocratsÕ 2015 election manifesto to contain a pledge 
to hold an in/out referendum on the UKÕs continuing EU membership, whilst 34 per 
cent were in favour (Liberal Democrat Voice, 01/04/2013). At the same time, party 
activists began stressing the need for Nick Clegg to recognise that the Euro was a 
mistake (Liberal Democrat Voice, 01/11/2012). Thus, whilst the party activists 
appeared very supportive of the EU in general, their support of the UKÕs membership 
of the Euro was weak. After the 2015 general election, surveys suggested that 86 per 
cent of Liberal Democrat members would vote to remain in the EU regardless of any 
terms of renegotiation (Webb and Bale 2015). 
 
Hence, in recent years, both LabourÕs and the Liberal DemocratsÕ leaderships had to 
manage a certain level of intra-party divisions on EU issues. This can explain, in part, 
why they avoided strongly Europhile statements in public when it could damage the 
cohesion of their parties.   
 
Conclusions 
The Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats have often been described as pro-
European or Europhile parties. In this article, we have investigated this claim. We 
first developed Taggart and SzczerbiakÕs (2008) concept of hard and soft 
Euroscepticism so that it also extends to hard and soft Europhilia. We then analyzed 
and compared the European policies of the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats 
between 2007 and 2015, focusing on BritainÕs relationship with the EU, the EUÕs 
institutional set-up, and European economic and monetary policies. We found that 
overall, Labour and the Liberal Democrats can be best described as soft and, at times, 
half-hearted, lukewarm, Europhiles. Whilst the two parties made the case for BritainÕs 
EU membership, selling it as a matter of Ônational interestÕ, they strongly emphasized 
the EUÕs need to reform its institutions and policies, thereby speaking less positively 
about the EU.  
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Admittedly, in the other big Western European member states, such as France, 
Germany, or Italy, this discourse would be interpreted as soft Euroscepticism. After 
all, both Labour and the Liberal Democrats started to openly reject BritainÕs 
membership of the Euro and also supported EU budget cuts. In most EU countries, 
such positions were adopted by fringe parties on the extreme left or right of the 
spectrum. However, in the British context, where outright rejection of EU 
membership is rife, Labour and the Liberal Democrats are relative Europhiles. Hence, 
the EU positions of political parties across Europe still need to be understood in their 
domestic context. This does not mean that we should refrain from conducting 
comparative research into party-based Euroscepticism and Europhilia. On the 
contrary, our extended typology can be applied to parties across Europe. For instance, 
a promising future research avenue would be to compare the European positions of 
Labour and the Liberal Democrats to those of their European sister parties. 
 
When we investigate party-based Euroscepticism and Europhilia, the partiesÕ self-
perception also matters. Both Labour and the Liberal Democrats still considered 
themselves Europhiles, but they now equated Europhilia with reformism. This EU 
approach is best illustrated by a quote from LabourÕs then shadow foreign secretary, 
Douglas Alexander, who made the following statement: 
 
For Labour, unlike some Conservatives, being pro-reform is not a proxy 
for being anti-Europe. Indeed, for Labour, the reform of Europe should 
not be seen as a question mark over our commitment to Britain's future 
within Europe. Instead it is not just the safest ground, but also the most 
solid foundation, on which a positive case about Britain's membership of 
the EU can be made - and the concerns of the public addressed. That is 
why Labour will continue to make the case for Britain's place in Europe - 
but also for reform within Europe (Douglas Alexander, 16/02/2013). 
 
The Liberal DemocratsÕ former leader, Nick Clegg, made a similar statement, arguing 
that Ôpro-Europeans are the real reformers nowÕ and that being Ôpro-European means 
being pro-reformÕ (Liberal Democrats, 09/05/2014). Thus, the two parties still 
perceived themselves as Europhiles.  
 
Against the backdrop of the European UnionÕs continuing economic, financial, and 
legitimacy crisis, this reformist discourse is hardly surprising. In fact, most, if not all, 
mainstream parties in Europe started to call for EU reform after the outbreak of the 
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Eurozone crisis. Yet, many of these parties called for more, not less, European 
integration. By contrast, Labour and the Liberal Democrats rarely made a positive, 
emotive case for the EU. They mainly praised the economic benefits of the EU, such 
as the membership of the single market of goods and services. Whether this rather 
sober message will be strong enough to convince the voters to vote in favour of 
staying in the EU in the upcoming referendum remains to be seen. At the least, given 
their strikingly similar EU policies, Labour and the Liberal Democrats could easily 
join forces during the EU referendum campaign.  
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